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By Bruce Dennis Sales*
Fitting Principles Within
A Positivistic Model of Law
I. INTRODUCTION
Positivism and in particular the views of H.L.A. Hart" have
come under serious criticism from several authors, the most no-
table of these being Ronald Dworkin,2 Graham Hughes3 and Sam-
uel Shuman. 4 Their objections to Hart's model focus on the fact
that judicial decision-making in the United States cannot be ex-
plained and predicted by a jurisprudential model that includes
only rules and separates out principles and policies.
That rules are the basic fabric of our law is not to be denied.
Statutory law attests to the validity of this proposition. But to
end analysis there, is to leave unexplained and unexplainable a
sizable percentage of judicial opinions. For example, Dworkin 6 ar-
gues that judges often are faced with a case where a rule does not
exist to dictate their decision. It is only after they reach their de-
cision that the rule springs into existence. Therefore, "the court
* B.A. Psychology 1966, Ph.D. Linguistics 1971, University of Rochester;
J.D. Northwestern University 1973; Member Illinois and Nebraska
Bars; Director, Law-Psychology Graduate Studies Program and Assist-
ant Professor of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
1. H. HART, THE CONCEPT op LAW (1961) [hereinafter cited as HART].
2. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855 (1972);
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L. REV. 14 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Model of Rules].
3. Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 77 YALE L.J. 411 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Hughes].
4. Shuman, Justification of Judicial Decisions, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 715
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Shuman].
5. Dworkin does deny this. See Dworkin articles, supra note 2. But see
Christie, The Model of Principles, 1968 DUKE L.J. 649 (1968); Gross,
Jurisprudence, in 1968/1969 ANNUAL SURVEY or Am. L. 575; Raz,
Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.. 823 (1972);
Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 Am. PHrL. Q. 151
(1971); Tapper, A Note On Principles, 1971 MODERN L. REV. 628 (1971).
6. Model of Rules, supra note 2.
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cites principles as its justification for adopting and applying a new
rule."' 7 Dworkin cites Riggs v. Palmer8 and Henningsen v. Bloom-
field, Inc.9 as representive of the class of decisions in which prin-
ciples are used.
In Riggs, a beneficiary murdered the testator in order to pre-
vent him from revoking the beneficiary's interest in the will. The
sole question before the court was whether or not the murderer
could take his interest under the will. As the court noted:
It is quite true that statutes regulating the making, proof, and ef-
fect of wills and the devolution of property, if literally construed,
and if their force and effect can in no way and under no circum-
stances be controlled or modified, give the property to the mur-
derer.10
The court disallowed the devise by reasoning that all laws may
be controlled by fundamental principles such as "no one shall be
permitted to profit by his own fraud or to take advantage of his
own wrong.. . or to acquire property by his own crime."'1  The
court acknowledged that this principle was the basis of the rule it
was about to create.
Under the Civil Law, evolved from the general principles of nat-
ural law and justice by many generations of jurisconsults, philos-
ophers, and statesmen, one cannot take property by inheritance or
will from an ancestor or benefactor whom he has murdered.12
In Henningsen, Mr. Henningsen purchased an automobile for
his wife. Ten days after delivery Mrs. Henningsen was severely
injured in an automobile accident due to defects in the new car.
Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Henningsen, suing for consequential dam-
ages comprising loss of the car plus hospital and medical bills,
named both the automobile dealer and the manufacturer as code-
fendants. The main issue in the case was whether or not the ex-
press warranty in the sales contract could eliminate all other war-
ranties including an implied warranty of merchantability. The
express warranty provided for repair and replacement of defec-
tive parts for ninety days or 4,000 miles, whichever came first and
went on to state that "this warranty . . . [is] expressly in lieu of
all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations
or liabilities on its part. . . ."18 The defendants argued that this
clause precluded a suit for personal injury based on a warranty
7. Id. at 29.
8. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
9. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
10. 115 N.Y. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189.
11. Id. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190.
12. Id. at 513, 22 N.E. at 190.
13. 32 N.J. at 367, 161 A.2d at 74.
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theory since the express warranty allowed only repair of defective
parts and disclaimed all other express or implied warranties. The
court, in reaching its landmark decision for the plaintiffs, relied on
principles of justice and public policy and noted that the warranty
provision, drawn up by the Automobile Manufacturers Association,
appeared in almost all new car sales contracts and eliminated the
buyer's bargaining power. The court weighed the two competing
principles of freedom of contract to disclaim liability versus dis-
parity in bargaining positions in agreeing to the disclaimer and
concluded that because the plaintiff had no negotiating strength,
public policy and a sense of justice required the disclaimer to be
held inoperative.14
The Riggs and Henningsen decisions support not only Dworkin's
arguments but also the arguments of Hughes and Shuman. Al-
though the import of the latter two writers' contentions against
Hart's model of law is similar to Dworkin's, the thrust of their ar-
guments vary.
Hughes is concerned with the fact that rules of law are often
open to more than one interpretation. Judges then must look be-
hind the law to the intent of the lawmaker in promulgating the
rule. This investigation reveals that "[p] olicy is almost always to
some extent articulated in law."'15 The court must then consider
these policies and principles in reaching its decision as to what the
rule of law is for the given facts. Hughes concludes that "[n] o
precise distinctions can be made between rules [and] principles
* . . but the terms serve to mark differences of degree in the pre-
cision of guides to decision-making."' 6
Whereas Hughes analyzes the problem a judge faces in applying
a rule to a given case, Shuman argues that a model of law requires
principles in addition to rules since stare decisis is really not the
conclusion of law or holding but rather is the ratio decidendi of
the court in reaching that holding. He notes that numerous cases
cite principles in the ratio and thus principles must be included in
the model of law.17
Accepting the validity of the proposition that principles are
part of American law and its judicial decision-making process still
leaves one with the problem of constructing a conceptual model for
rules and principles which (a) most accurately accounts for the
way courts, in fact, reach their decisions and (b) accounts for the
14. Id. at 388-91, 161 A.2d at 86-87.
15. Hughes, supra note 3, at 439.
16. Id. at 419.
17. Shuman, supra note 4.
PRINCIPLES AND POSITIVISM
relative place and importance of each variable in a jurisprudential
model.
Throughout this article, it will be contended that a theory of
law must include both principles and rules if the theory is to de-
scribe accurately the legal process in its day-to-day workings. This
position is admittedly antithetical to most legal philosophers 18 who
see rules and principles as mutually exclusive and unincorporable.
Violation of the usual position is necessitated since a model of law
should transcend philosophy and become a useful tool for all law-
yers, judges and legislators in guiding their day-to-day legal deci-
sions. It is to the task of building this model that this article now
turns.
H. HART'S MODEL OF RULES
Since rules are basic to our system of law, it is reasonable to
modify a pre-existing rule oriented theory rather than start anew.
Hart presents the best conceptual analysis of rules 9 to date. His
model, a reaction to Austin's20 and other models of positivism, cor-
rected the basic flaw that marred positivistic thinking. Namely,
traditional positivism lacked any satisfactory structure to account
for the variety of laws existing today or to predict what would
classify as a law. It is this predictive aspect of a model that takes
it from theory to pragmatic usefulness. Whereas Austin accounts
for law with the over-simplistic postulation of a sovereign who is
habitually obeyed, 21 Hart postulates a closed system of rules that
will always predict what is or is not a rule of that legal system.2
Hart divides rules into two categories: primary and secondary.
Primary rules are those rules that directly control and govern our
behavior such as a rule against speeding. Secondary rules, on the
other hand, are those rules which allow us to identify the primary
ones and thus allow us to predict when an utterance is a rule of
law. As Hart states:
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the
basic or primary type, human beings are required to do or abstain
from certain actions, whether they wish to or not. Rules of the
other type are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary to the first;
for they provide that human beings may by doing or saying cer-
tain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or
18. See, e.g., Dworkin articles, supra note 2.
19. HART, supra note 1.
20. J. AusTIN, LEcTunEs ON THE pHmIosoPHY oF PosIT LAw (5th ed.
1885).
21. Id.
22. See HART, supra note 1, at 77-119.
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modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or
control their operations. 23
There are three types of secondary rules: rules of recognition,
rules of change (public and private) and rules of adjudication.24
The rule of recognition "will specify some feature or features pos-
session of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive af-
firmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported
by the social pressure it exerts."2 5 An example would be article
I, section 8 of the United States Constitution conferring on Con-
gress the power to control interstate commerce. Were it not for
that provision, a secondary rule of recognition, any acts of Con-
gress concerning commerce amongst the states would be invalid.
Thus, describing a primary rule as valid, is to say that it has met
all the tests of a rule of recognition.
26
Rules of change authorize particular people or groups to enact
new primary rules or eliminate old rules.2 7 As Hart notes, "There
will be a very close connection between the rules of change and
the rules of recognition.128 Rules of change allow modification of
the otherwise static quality of primary rules that rules of recogni-
tion would create. For example, a rule of recognition authorizes
Congress to enact laws regulating interstate commerce. But once
Congress promulgates a law controlling a particular topic, can it
change that rule as the years outdate it? A rule of change au-
thorizes Congress to do so.
The last class of secondary rules, rules of adjudication, empower
certain individuals such as judges to determine and resolve con-
23. Id. at 78-79. Hart contends it is meaningless to talk of the validity of
the rule of recognition and that it can only be evaluated as
theoretically appropriate for its particular use. Id. at 105-06. Hart's
theoretical system assumes a hierarchy between the secondary rules
and the primary rules of obligation with power to confer validity
only being able to flow downward from the secondary to the
primary rules. This conception is not necessary nor necessarily the
most desirable. When the framers of the constitution met to draw up
that most important document, that act being pre-legal, that is it
occurred before the existence of our formalized legal system between
the states, was neither valid nor invalid but only appropriate by con-
sensual validation, accord by the people to follow its rulings. The
document itself, however, may be placed within the closed system of
rules and its separate rules validated by reference to the concept of
the product resulting from the act. Hart notes that the rule of rec-
ognition is an ultimate rule with the constitutional rules being the
supreme criterion of validity. Id. at 102-03.
24. Id. at 92-95.
25. Id. at 92.
26. Id. at 100.
27. Id. at 93.
28. Id.
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flicts as to the rights and duties of individuals under rules, or to
determine when a particular rule has been broken.29  The statute
conferring power on a particular court to hear probate matters
and declare the law in these matters provides an obvious example
of a rule of adjudication.
Hart feels (a feeling in which the present author concurs) that
this model is a necessary and powerful antecedent to conceptualiz-
ing and understanding the way in fact the legal system works.30
It presents a framework from which internally to analyze the legal
system including such concepts as obligation, rights, duty, validity,
source of law and authority.
That an internal perspective is essential has been overlooked
not only by traditional positivists, but also by American realists.
They have overemphasized what courts in fact do; this em-
phasis yields an accurate taxonomy of events but provides no con-
ceptual understanding of the underlying legal process that would
allow a predictive description of the source and use of law.
Hughes defines rules, for example, as "fairly concrete guides
for decision geared to narrow categories of behavior and prescrib-
ing narrow patterns of conduct."3' 1 This definition does not tell
what a rule is, how it can be identified, or when it is valid. It
simply but inaccurately describes that when a person has a rule at
his disposal, it will guide his behavior or judgment as to a partic-
ular fact situation with a fair degree of certainty.32 This definition
can only be an attempted summary of judicial opinions under rules.
Jurisprudentially, it has not aided in identifying the appropriate
standard3 3 to be used or in explaining why a rule does not always
act as the dispositive guide for a judicial decision. Furthermore,
without postulating the secondary rules of adjudication, change
and recognition, it is impossible to prescriptively explain the judi-
cial decision-making process when no statutory rule or common
law precedent is available to guide the judge.
29. Id. at 94-95.
30. Id. at 76-79.
31. Hughes, supra note 3, at 419.
32. Hughes' definition is valuable for purposes of demonstrating that the
legal system cannot be analyzed solely in terms of rules. Specifically,
if a rule is only "fairly concrete," then conversely there must be in-
stances where exactness of application is impossible. This opens the
court to judicial discretion or judgment in interpretation and con-
struction and often-times to balancing one rule against another or
against another type of standard. All of which indicates that rules
are not impregnable guides to outcome determination.
33. E.g., rule, principle or policy.
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With Hart's model, on the other hand, it can apriorily be de-
termined when a rule is valid. The statute enacted by the state
legislature would be valid because certain rules, the secondary
rules, within the state and federal constitutions authorize the state
legislature to enact primary rules on the statute's subject matter.
These secondary rules also include limitations, for example due
process, 34 so that if the statute speaks to a valid topic, but exceeds
the limitation imposed within these secondary rules, the rule will
be invalid and a court will hold it unconstitutional.
If the state legislature repeals a law and enacts a new one in
its place, the same type of analysis is pertinent. However, the
secondary rule of change is brought into play. The secondary rule
of change also contains limitations or is limited by the rules of
recognition. A state court could not repeal a federal statute or en-
act a contradictory state statute if the rule of recognition empow-
ered only Congress to speak on that point. If, on the other hand,
Congress had invaded a subject matter left to states by the appro-
priate rule of recognition, a court would hold the state statute
valid and overrule the federal statute.
This discussion indicates the desirability of Hart's approach and
its power as a theory, at least as applied to statutory law. Hart's
model allows post hoc determination of any statutory rule's va-
lidity and apriorily determines the validity of a particular body
enacting a new rule on a particular subject. 35
When applying Hart's analysis to judge-made law, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between the easy and hard cases. Hart's analy-
sis applies with full power, for example, when the judge is con-
fronted with an easy case where the facts clearly fit within the
purview of only one rule. Thus, in a criminal case where the de-
fendant is charged with assault3 6 and the facts fall clearly within
the scope of the assault statute, the judge only needs to decide if
the statute is valid under its rule of recognition. With a hard
case, however, where the facts do not come within the purview of
any pre-existing rule, Hart's analysis loses its predictive accuracy;
34. The Due Process Clause is a secondary rule in that it limits the
power of Congress to enact certain types of primary rules.
35. The analysis applies equally as well to rules of lesser import which
are made by other legislative or administrative bodies. In working
with the municipal building regulations, for example, Hart's analysis
can explain and predict the validity of these rules in terms of the
legal system. By looking to their source, the secondary rules upon
which their validity rests, the relative import of these rules can be
determined.
36. The criminal statute on assault which governs the behavior of the
citizenry is a primary rule.
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although it does maintain its descriptive power. It is impossible
for the model to predict the outcome inasmuch as there is no pri-
mary rule to evaluate until the judge reaches his decision and
states his holding. The model can account descriptively for this
process by acknowledging that through the rules of adjudication
and change, a judge has power to determine the law on the par-
ticular subject. Hart notes:
No doubt the courts so frame their judgments as to give the im-
pression that their decisions are the necessary consequence of pre-
determined rules whose meaning is fixed and clear. In very sim-
ple cases this may be so; but in the vast majority of cases that
trouble the courts, neither statutes nor precedents in which the
rules are allegedly contained allow of only one result ... It is
only the tradition that judges 'find' and do not 'make' law that
conceals this. .... 37
Hart's model accounts for this process of "finding" the law
through the concept of open-texturism which refers to two facts
in the judicial decision-making process. The first and primary fact,
according to Hart, is that for most rules there will be both clear
and borderline fact situations. He states:
All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as in-
stances of general terms, and in the case of everything which we
are prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear central
cases, where it certainly applies and others where there are rea-
sons for both asserting and denying that it applies. Nothing can
eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of
doubt when we are engaged in bringing particular situations un-
der general rules. This imparts to all rules a fringe of vagueness
of 'open texture'. .... .8
The second reality is that there will be cases which do not fall
within the purview of any rule.
"The open texture of the law means that there are, indeed, areas of
conduct where much must be left to be developed by courts or
officials striking a balance, in light of circumstances, between com-
peting interests which vary in weight from case to case." 39
The open-texturism of rules necessitates that any jurispruden-
tial model, if it is to be accurate and answer Dworkin's arguments
against rules, 40 include a conceptual analysis of what the law is
and how judges "find it" or "make it" in these borderline or hard
cases. Open-texturism creates the usage of principles in court de-
cisions and necessitate their inclusion in a model of law. Unfor-
tunately, Hart's model does not present a detailed analysis of open-
texturism or rules accounting for it.
37. HART, supra note 1, at 12.
38. Id. at 119-20.
39. Id. at 132.
40. See Dworkin articles, supra note 2.
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III. ANALYSIS OF OPEN-TEXTURISM
The cause of open-texturism is explained by Hart in the fol-
lowing manner:
It is a feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative
one) that we labour under two connected handicaps whenever we
seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some sphere of
conduct by means of general standards to be used without further
official direction on particular occasions. The first handicap is
our relative ignorance of fact: the second is our relative inde-
terminancy of aim.41
The two handicaps discussed by Hart, primarily manifest them-
selves in the following ways. Courts often face a problem in in-
terpreting the words of a rule to ascertain its intended meaning.
Interpretation is necessitated because of the semantic indetermi-
nancy of language. 42 In addition, courts must construe the words
of a rule to determine if the facts of the given case are within the
purview of that rule. In construction, the court looks beyond the
four corners of the instrument to determine the lawmakers' inten-
tion in promulgating the rule.4 3
The necessity of construing a rule mirrors the external vari-
ance caused by an infinite variety of possible fact situations.
"[W] e are forced to recognize both clear standard cases and chal-
lengeable borderline cases."'44 With these two judicial problems in
mind, it can be seen that there are various species of the genera,
easy and hard cases. This continuum has never been delineated by
prior writers but definitely exists.
A clear example of an easy case is one where the facts of the
case clearly fit within the purview of only one rule. Conversely,
a clear example of a hard case is one where the facts do not come
within the purview of any rule. This type of case led Dworkin 45
to postulate the role of principles as law and to reject the rule-
oriented model. Between these two extremes lies a continuum
of examples which also define hard cases. These examples include:
where only some of the facts are within the purview of the rule;
where the facts clearly fit within the plain meaning of the rule but
the outcome under that rule clashes with the statutory purpose,
the underlying policy or the legislative intent; where the facts fit
both the purview of a rule and a legal principle; where the facts
do not clearly fit any rule but some of these facts (not necessarily
41. HART, supra note 1, at 125.
42. See A. CoRsn,, CoNTR cTs § 534 (one vol. ed. 1952).
43. Id.
44. HART, supra note 1, at 4.
45. See Dworkin articles, supra note 2.
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the same ones) fall within the purview of two or more rules; and
where "conflicting claims may be equally supported by the same
legal standard." 46
The existence of all these different types of hard cases suggests
that rules are not equally powerful or work uniformly in all cases.
As Shuman contends: "It is necessary to recognize that rules ...
function differently, both as to their appropriateness and as to
their relative weight, in justifying judicial decisions.1 47 This dif-
ferential weighting of rules that occurs in judicial application is
necessitated by three factors: the rule's pedigree, its internal struc-
ture and its appropriateness when applied to the external fact sit-
uation.
To speak of pedigree means to ask if the standard is valid ac-
cording to the rule of recognition. If the standard is valid, it is a
valid primary rule. But the pedigree goes beyond simply valid or
invalid. Primary rules do have different import because of the
particular secondary rule which authorized their promulgation.
Thus, there is a hierarchy of rules. Examples of these different
imports are distinctions of the federal versus state law, procedure
versus substantive and constitutional versus statutory. Hart has
,explicitly recognized this point in his book. He notes that pri-
mary and secondary rules differ from each other and among them-
selves.48 He states that "provision may be made for their possible
conflict by their arrangement in an order of superiority, as shown
by the common subordination of custom or precedent to statute,
the latter being a 'superior source' of law."49 Within a given level
on this ordering, there will be further ordering based upon inter-
46. Shuman, supra note 4, at 723. Shuman offers this species as the
hallmark of the hard case.
47. Id.
48. HART, supra note 1, at 91-94. Dowkin, on the other hand, takes a dif-
ferent position.
Principles have a dimension that rules do not-the dimension
of weight or importance. We can speak of rules as being
functionally important or unimportant ... In this sense,
one legal rule may be more important than another because
it has a greater or more role in regulating behavior. But
we cannot say that one rule is more important than another
within the system of rules, so that when two rules conflict
one supercedes the other by virtue of its greater weight.
Model of Rules, supra note 2, at 27.
Dworkin's position is open to criticism since it forces his distinc-
tion to theoretical meaninglessness. If courts in fact treat rules dif-
ferentially, that is, as Dworkin would say they are functionally dif-
ferent, how can a theory that is supposed to describe the real world
data treat rules as equivalent in importance?
49. HART, supra note 1, at 92-93.
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nal structure and external appropriateness of the various rules.
This hierarchy within secondary and primary rules provides a
judge with one guide for choosing a particular rule over another.
Since rules vary in their import, it is surprising that such a clear
division between rules and principles as non-rules developed in
jurisprudence. Because of open-texturism, there is a hierarchy of
rules and judges are forced to exercise their judgment in deter-
mining which rule applies. This exercise of judicial discretion re-
quires that other standards be considered in "finding" the rule for
the case at bar. To prove this assertion, one need only consider
the meaning of stare decisis.
In decisional law, there is the familiar doctrine of stare decisis;
but what exactly does this doctrine mean? Hart finds a simple
answer for English law. "[T]he English system of precedent has
. .. [produced], by its use, a body of rules of which a vast num-
ber, of both major and minor importance, are as determinate as any
statutory rule."50  Thus, one answer is that stare decisis refers
to the rules of the prior cases. Shuman, on the other hand, takes
a different approach:
Giving respect to or standing by prior decisions as obligated by
stare decisis does not tell the judge how to decide a future case.
Rather it tells him and those who will assess his performance
that whatever decision he reaches, he must account for all arguably
relevant rules, principles, and policies announced in prior cases.
•... Thus, stare decisis does not require that later courts follow
earlier ones in using the same rule, ratio, or ultimate conclusion
in like cases, but only that the same standards be used, and that
the same category of facts be considered in deciding whether a
standard is met.51
While Hart considers a precedent to be a rule, Shuman consid-
ers precedent to be the obligation of the court to consider both the
conclusion of law in respect to the given fact situation and the
standards which justified that decision. These two positions are
not antithetical. While Hart's analysis describes stare decisis for
easy cases, Shuman's analysis accurately describes what occurs
during those remaining hard cases.
Interestingly, Shuman's analysis more accurately reflects the use
of precedent in American law. For example, to cite precedent is to
assume and substantiate that the facts of the prior case and the
present case are identical or at least similar in all operative aspects.
Even where this is the case, courts in this country have consist-
50. Id. at 132.
51. Shuman, supra note 4, at 721-22.
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ently looked beyond the conclusion at law of the prior case to the
reasoning behind it inorder to assess the desirability and/or valid-
ity of the prior decision.
It is in the ratio decidendi that principles most often find their
way into decisional law. If stare decisis includes the ratio, and it
appears it must if open-texturism is ever to be explained ade-
quately, those principles that appear in the ratio must be consid-
ered as law. To argue that they are not as important as other le-
gal rules does not negate from the fact that they must also be
considered rules since rules do differ in their import.
IV. PRINCIPLES AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
There are two types of principles that must be distinguished
since only one of them may be placed within a legal model. The
distinction drawn by this article between two classes of principles
is not new, but traces its origin to Kant, who wrote:
Practical principles are propositions which contain general determi-
nation of the will, having under it several practical rules. They
are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the
subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or prac-
tical laws, when the condition is recognized as objective, that is
valid, for the will of every rational being.52
The first type, the subjective, consists of those principles which
are an individual's own guide and are not included in the legal
model. 53 Included in this category would be one's moral, ethical
or religious principles, such as: Do unto others as you would have
them do unto you. There is nothing legal in this category inas-
much as the imposition of the principle as a guide to one's be-
havior comes from the individual or some group he belongs to or
believes in and not from the lawmakers (legislators) or legal de-
terminers (courts) as sanctioned by the secondary rules.
Unfortunately, it is from this class of principles that the natural
law philosophers drew the standards which they tried to elevate
to the status of law and rules of law. Hart notes:
[T]he Thomist tradition of Natural Law ... comprises a twofold
contention: first that there are certain principles of true morality
or justice, discoverable by human reason without the aid of reve-
lation even though they have a divine origin; secondly that man-
made laws which conflict with these principles are not valid law.54
52. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, as cited by PEBELmAN, JUSTICE
726 (1967).
53. It might be argued that some of these should be included but personal
opinion is not at issue here.
54. HART, supra note 1, at 152.
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Under the scrutiny of a positivistic approach, the attempt of
natural lawyers was futile. The natural law model is inadequate
because it provides no internal criteria comparable to Hart's sec-
ondary rules to determine what is a valid legal rule. Today the
use of the term "principles" still is associated with this subjective
form of standard thereby obscuring the objective principles.55
Kant referred to the second class of principles as objective and
law because this class contains valid guides for human behavior.50
In terms of the rule-oriented model, these principles are valid prin-
ciples of law (technically they may be called valid primary rules
of law) because they conform to the secondary rules.57  Consider
the statutory rule "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." 58
Legislative enactment, pursuant to the rule of recognition, clearly
classifies this principle of good faith as a primary rule.59
Judicial decision-making illustrates the same process. In ar-
riving at a new precedent, judges often cite these objective prin-
ciples as justifying their decisions. In certain cases, these prin-
ciples are the holding's sole justification and actually become the
conclusion of law. A case in point is the Supreme Court's opinion
in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.,60 where the
principle that equity will not aid a person who comes to court with
unclean hands became the rule of misuse of patent rights.
Hart acknowledges that this process exists when he states:
The law of every modern state shows at a thousand points the
influence of both the accepted social morality and wider moral
ideals. These influences enter into law either abruptly and avow-
edly through legislation, or silently and piecemeal through the ju-
dicial process. In some systems, as in the United States, the ulti-
mate criteria of legal validity explicitly incorporate principles ofjustice or substantive moral values .... 61
55. Hart is guilty of this association. Id. at 151-80. He never considers
the possibility that principles could be other than moral.
56. Since Kant was postulating acceptance and reason as the determiners
of validity, he is considered here by analogy only.
57. The possibility that a legal principle may be a secondary rule is not
considered since the author of this article's analysis to date only sup-
ports the conclusion that it is a primary one.
58. UNIFORM COM MERCIAL CODE § 1-203.
59. It might be argued that principles are vaguer than rules and thus the
principle should not be classified as the rule. This argument is falla-
cious for two reasons. First, what determines whether a given stand-
ard is a valid primary rule is its authority under a secondary rule
and not its scope of applicability. Second, the open-textureness of
a rule encompasses the form of a principle.
60. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
61. HART, supra note 1, at 199. Conceptually, Hart's analysis of princi-
ples would be more consistent if he had distinguished between the
PRINCIPLES AND POSITIVISM
He does not state, however, how these principles which are judi-
cially enunciated become valid laws, although his secondary rules
of adjudication and change easily encompass them.62 By these
secondary rules, the principle enunciated in the court's conclusion
of law is a decisional rule of law and valid within the model's cri-
teria.
This paper has considered two classes of principles: the sub-
jective, non-legal principles of morality and religion, and the ob-
jective, legal principles which are definitely rules of law within
the positivistic model because they appear in statutory or deci-
sional form. There is a third class of principles which must be
dealt with, however, and this class poses the more difficult prob-
lems.
This third class is composed of those principles which courts
discuss in their opinions, but which were (a) not applied in forming
the courts' holdings or conclusions of law or (b) were applied but
do not appear obvious in a reading of the conclusions of law alone.
These principles fall some place between the two extreme points
since they are objective in terms of a court judicially declaring
that they must be considered in arriving at an opinion. If stare de-
cisis is considered to include the ratio decidendi which justifies
the conclusion of law, it is logical to argue that the intermediate
principle which justified the conclusion, but does not appear obvious
in it, is a rule of law albeit the weakest one in its import.
Those principles, on the other hand, which have not been cited
by a court cannot be considered law. As Perelman notes, "For all
societies and all intellects, there exist certain values and beliefs
that at a given moment are approved without reservation and ac-
cepted without argument; hence, there is no need to justify them.'13
This is not the case here and it thus remains for the proponent to
convince the court at another time.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to argue that an adequate the-
ory of law must include both principles and rules. Past writings
moral-subjective principles and the legal-objective principles. His
statement indicates that he is allowing for the latter although he
doesn't explicitly label them as such.
62. It is ironic Dworkin concluded that Hart's theory could not account
for these objective principles. Dworkin's selectively emphasizing
Hart's use of moral principles while overlooking the legal ones com-
bined with his over-emphasis on the rule of recognition to the ex-
clusion of the other secondary rules could account for his conclu-
sions.
63. PEmLmA, JusTicE 64 (1967).
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have demonstrated that both types of standards are indeed opera-
tive in the legal process. Yet these same writings have either ig-
nored the task of suggesting an adequate model of law or have ad-
hered to the notion that principles and rules could not be combined
in one model. This later point of view is based on theoretical as-
sumptions and niceties that must be ignored if legal philosophy
is to serve a utilitarian function to the everyday practice of law.
Because rules are the basic fabric of our law and Hart has pre-
sented the best model of rules to date, his model has been pre-
sented as the framework for including principles. An analysis of
Hart's concept of law demonstrated its predictive and descriptive
adequacy in accounting for statutory law and easy cases in deci-
sional law, but showed its inadequacy for predicting and explain-
ing the remaining hard cases that judges must decide. Hart simply
but inadequately dealt with this area by labeling it open-texturism.
Because of this void in Hart's model, this article undertook to
analyze what open-texturism comprises and how it effects a model
of law. This analysis revealed that rules are not uniform in weight
or applicability, but exist in a hierarchy and this in turn suggested
that judges must turn to other standards in order to "find" the law.
An analysis of stare decisis supported the notion that rules are
hierarchial and revealed that judges often cite principles in decid-
ing their conclusion of law. Accepting Shuman's notion that stare
decisis includes both the ratio decidendi and the ultimate conclu-
sion of law, it was concluded that principles cited in the ratio or
in the holding can indeed qualify as rules of law.
An analysis of principles demonstrated that legal, objective
principles such as those which appear in the court's opinion or the
holding must be separated from non-legal, subjective principles
which are individually held and believed. It is the confusion be-
tween these two types of principles that has hindered recognition
that some principles must be classified as law. Since Hart's sec-
ondary rules easily encompass these legal principles, they can be
classified as rules and fit within a positivistic model of the law.
To deny that principles can and do operate as rules of law in
many cases is first to force the postulation of an inaccurate and
inadequate theory of law, and second to force judges to hide the
fact that their decision was guided by a valid legal principle. As
Llewellyn has noted, "The net effect is unnecessary confusion and
unpredictability, together with inadequate remedy, and evil per-
sisting that calls for remedy. Covert tools are never reliable
tools." 64
64. LIewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 703 (1937).
